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Community-based selection of social program recipients has the potential to benefit 
from local knowledge about individuals in need. This informational advantage 
however might be offset by local elite capture and administrative incompetency. 
Using Indonesia's anti-poverty program, this paper investigates which pre-program 
conditions are associated with community-based targeting outcomes. Results show 
that wealthier and more unequal villages constantly target better. This suggests that, 
though there is much concern about local capture in communities with large 
inequality, the ease of identifying the poor could overwhelm the possibly larger 
political influence of local elites. Also, villages headed by young, educated persons 
initially exhibit better targeting, but lose this advantage over time, as the monitoring 
of loan disbursement becomes more difficult for village heads. I explore Indonesia's 
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 1 Introduction
Recently, there has been a growing interest in the integration of community involvement in
social program provision.1 In the distribution of program benets, a decentralized, community-
based selection of beneciaries is considered to be less costly and more accurate. This is be-
cause local agents (such as community ocials and social organization members) have better
information about who deserves assistance within the community relative to the central gov-
ernment (Alderman, 2002; Faguet, 2004). However, much anecdotal and theoretical evidence
points to the possibility that local non-poor elites capture program resources,2 particularly
in communities with large economic inequality. The lack of administrative capability among
local agents can also oset the informational advantage.3 It is unclear how much and at which
stages of program implementation these factors limit the eectiveness of community-based tar-
geting. If communities with strong elites prioritize an allocation to the non-poor, assistance
may only reach the intended beneciaries at a later stage. If monitoring of benet allocations
becomes dicult for local agents over time, targeting performance may decline. Therefore, in
designing community-based targeting, it is crucial to know which communities can prioritize
delivery to the poor. Despite the ambiguity in the overall eectiveness of community based
targeting, rigorous empirical evidence is relatively scarce on factors associated with changes
in the targeting performance.
This paper ll this gap by showing how changes in targeting performance are associated
with a rich array of pre-program community conditions, including inequality in consumption
1For instance, see Mansuri and Rao (2004) and World Bank (2000, 2004)
2For example, Dreze and Sen (1989) point to possibly undesirable allocations of relief when the poor are
powerless within communities. Numerous descriptive studies report consistent evidence (Antlov, 2003; Conning
and Kevane, 2002; Crook and Manor, 1998, among others). Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000, 2005) theoretically
demonstrate that the allocation of program benets between dierent groups of constituencies depends on the
political in
uence of these groups, which in turn hinges on their political awareness and socio-economic status.
3For instance, see Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott (2004) and Conning and Kevane (2002).
1and education levels as well as the characteristics of local agents. In particular, I exploit the
panel information on targeting outcomes of Indonesia's anti-poverty program, Inpres Desa
Terttingal (IDT, 1994-1997). The government selected poor villages under this program for
funding designated for small business loans. In turn, selected poor villages chose households
eligible for loans according to their own criteria. Results show that wealthier and more unequal
villages constantly target well. This suggests that inequality is not always associated with
elite capture. It could be oset by targeting-improving factors in unequal villages, such as an
easier identication of the poor and acceptance of placing priority on them. Evidence is also
found that villages with young, educated heads initially exhibit better targeting, but lose this
advantage over time, as the monitoring of loan disbursement becomes more dicult for village
heads.
These ndings are related to the growing literature on targeting and decentralization. The-
ory suggests that the degree of capture can depend on local contexts (Bardhan and Mookherjee,
2000, 2005). Indeed, a meta-analysis of targeted anti-poverty programs indicates that the per-
formance in allocating benets to the poor varies signicantly within programs adopting the
same scheme of community-based targeting (Coady et al., 2004).4 This suggests the impor-
tance of investigating local factors that might explain this variance.5 However, evidence from
cross-sectional studies is mixed. Coady et al. (2004) nd that richer, more unequal, and more
accountable countries target well. On the other hand, in Bangladesh's Food-for-Education
program, villages with higher inequality in landholding attain a lower participation rate for
4IDT involved geographic targeting based on proxy means-testing as well. In order to focus on the het-
erogeneity in community-based targeting, this paper mainly studies the within-village distribution of program
benets. The eectiveness of geographic targeting is investigated in a number of studies (for example, Baker
and Grosh, 1994; Bigman, Dercon, Guillaume, and Lambotte, 2000; Bigman and Srinivasan, 2002; Elbers,
Fujii, Landouw, Ozler, and Yin, 2007; Glewwe, 1992; Schady, 2002). Also, Coady (2006) and Skouas, Davis,
and de la Vega (2001) evaluate targeting outcomes under PROGRESA, which used geographic targeting jointly
with other targeting schemes.
5Jayne, Strauss, Yamano, and Molla (2001) also nd a large variation in the allocation pattern across
dierent regions in Ethiopia in its food aid / food-for-work programs.
2the poor compared to the non-poor, and poorer villages show better targeting (Galasso and
Ravallion, 2005).6 In Indonesia's rice subsidy program, districts with higher ethnic fragmen-
tation and lower density have more subsidized rice go missing before it reaches the intended
beneciaries, but the median per capita expenditure and within-district inequality are not
signicantly correlated with the degree of corruption (Olken, 2006).
These cross-sectional studies do not address whether targeting performance changes and
which local conditions are associated with the changes.7 A few exceptional studies include
Ravallion (1999), who shows that a reduction in program budget worsened targeting perfor-
mance in Argentina. Based on this nding, he points to the possibility that program resources
begin to reach the poor only after the non-poor capture some share in the early stages of
program implementation. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006) explore how targeting outcomes
change when poverty, inequality, and political competition change within villages. They nd
that targeting deterioration is associated with increased land inequality only in an employ-
ment generation program, but not in credit and agricultural minikit programs. Given these
ndings, they conclude that administration of local public good programs is more likely to
involve capture due to its less transparent nature. My results are consistent with this view;
under IDT, where the benets are private goods, little evidence is found for a link between
within-community inequality and poor targeting.
Relatively limited evidence is available for the relationship between targeting and charac-
6Also, in the related literature on the community-based choice of public projects, Araujo, Ferreira, Lanjouw,
and Ozler (2006) report that inequality is correlated with a lower probability of receiving pro-poor projects
such as latrines.
7Some studies examine changes in inter- and within-community targeting performance, but the lack of data
often precludes the investigation of local factors associated with within-community targeting. For example,
Park, Wang, and Wu (2002) report that the targeting of poor counties under China's qiba program deteriorated
over time, but within-county distribution is unknown. Stifel and Alderman (2005) show the changes in inter-
and intra-district targeting under Peru's Vaso de Leche transfer program, but the factors related to these
changes are not examined. Also, Jayne, Strauss, Yamano, and Molla (2002) investigate the relationship between
current and past receipt of program resources. They nd that some households are chronic beneciaries,
suggesting the possibility of aid dependence.
3teristics of local agents. Related studies indicate that it is important to monitor or regulate
their actions. Olken (2007) shows that monitoring by upper-level government reduces corrup-
tion in local infrastructure projects. Ravallion (2000) reports that within-province targeting
improved after a set of rules on implementation and targeting was provided by the central
government, together with a larger budget. Numerous case studies report that monitoring and
involvement of upper-level government are associated with better outcomes.8 I explore the
relationship between local agents and government of higher levels in Indonesia, which provides
insight into my empirical ndings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes more details of IDT, and
section 3 explains the data and targeting measures used in the analysis. Followed by the illus-
tration of empirical strategy, section 5 discusses the results for overall targeting performance.
Section 6 moves on to the results for changes in targeting performance. Section 7 concludes.
2 Anti-Poverty Program for Left-behind Villages, IDT
2.1 The Scope and Implementation Process of IDT
Inpres Desa Terttingal (IDT) was launched by the Indonesian government to strengthen
the income-generating power of poor households in disadvantaged communities, which were
deemed as being left behind during the economic growth of the 1970s and 1980s. The gov-
ernment provided these selected poor villages with grants designated for loans for productive
investment. The central government rst identied poor villages using a formula-based wel-
fare indicator called \village score." Selected village were then allowed to identify households
8For example, Wade (1997), Parry (1997) and Johnson, Deshingkar, and Start (2005). Another set of related
studies on local governance suggests that political competition does not matter in within-village targeting
(Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006), and the evidence on the eect of local democracy is mixed (Olken, 2008;
Rosenzweig and Foster, 2003).
4eligible for a loan. In order to encourage the use of local knowledge of residents' well-being,
the central government simply instructed selected villages to target \poor people who live in
a village," without imposing any selection criteria. A village head and a local government
agency called Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa (LKMD, Village Community Resilience
Board) were assigned to facilitate the selection of poor households (Badan Pusat Statistik
(BPS), 1994).
The scope of IDT is signicant. Each selected village received Rp. 20 million (approxi-
mately US$8932) per annum.9 With approximately one-third of Indonesia's more than 60,000
villages funded for three scal years, government spending on the program totalled over Rp.
1.2 trillion (US$536 million). IDT also achieved relatively wide coverage. Among selected
villages, 34% of households had received an IDT loan at least once by the end of the pro-
gram period, 1994-1997. This gure corresponds to 13% of all Indonesian households. Among
these participants, the cumulative loan size averaged Rp.467,776, which was about 2.5 (9.8)
times the average monthly household (per capita) expenditure among participating households
(Appendix Table 1[A]).10
In order to select poor villages, a village score was computed based on the availability and
quality of infrastructure and the living standard of residents. A village was designated as poor,
and thus received the grant, if its score was below the provincial threshold.11 As the village
score formula was modied in the second year of the program, some villages were added to the
funding list. While most villages continued to receive funding regardless of the second-year
village score, a minor fraction of villages with a very small number of households ceased to
9This is based on the 1995 average exchange rate of Rp.2239 per 1995 dollar (Indonesian Financial Statistics,
Bank Indonesia).
10Author's calculation based on the SUSENAS 1997.
11In the initial year, two thresholds were used. A village was funded if its score was below the lower of
the two thresholds, and not funded if it was above the higher threshold. If the score was between the two
thresholds, the funding status was determined by the local eld ocer.
5receive grants based on a concern that the across-village dierences in the per capita grant
value were too large (Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS), 1995). My community-based (within-
village) analysis uses villages that were funded at least once, and controls for the process of
village selection.
Within selected villages, eligible households were identied and formed into groups.12 They
were required to submit project proposals to the village head and then to the sub-district
government. Upon approval, the groups received funds directly through a local branch of
a state-owned bank, and were responsible for loan management.13 Most eligible households
(84%) participated in the program.
Since IDT was a departure from the centralized approach, there was broad concern about
the local ability to implement the program (Booth, 1994). The program was followed by a simi-
lar community-based scheme called Kecamatan Development Program (Daley and Fane, 2002),
and there is an on-going call for continuing targeted poverty alleviation and a community-based
development approach (World Bank, 2006).
2.2 Previous Studies on IDT
The availability of nationally representative data and the explicit, formula-based village se-
lection rule has attracted many researchers to investigate the inter-village distribution of IDT
funds; however, its within-village distribution and the association with the local conditions
have not yet been investigated. For example, Alatas (2000) shows that the rules to select poor
villages were closely followed, involving few errors. As a result, districts with a lower level
12Groups were sometimes based on the geographic location of eligible households, and on existing organiza-
tions such as farmers' groups and other occupational groups (Perdana and Maxwell, 2004).
13Detailed management schemes such as interest rates and repayment cycles were determined in each group,
and the information underlying these decisions is unknown to researchers.
6of average PCE had a larger number of IDT villages (Daimon, 2001).14 The impact of IDT
has also been analyzed, with dierent identication strategies resulting in mixed ndings. On
one hand, the results based on matching methods indicate few eects.15 On the other hand,
studies using the variation in per capita/household grant value nd signicant negative eects
on poverty and inequality.16
3 Data and Targeting Performance
3.1 Data
My empirical analysis utilizes the following three datasets: First, information on IDT benets
and household characteristics is extracted from the 1996 and 1997 National Socio-Economic
Household Survey (SUSENAS) - a nationally representative, cross-sectional survey of house-
holds. Second, 1993 Village Potential Statistics (PODES), a village-level census, provides
information on village characteristics that had been observed before IDT started. Third,
village- and year-specic funding status is available in the IDT administrative dataset. I
14This does not mean that the IDT's village selection rules were perfect. For instance, the case studies from
two provinces indicate a possibility that geographic targeting omitted some poor households residing outside
IDT villages (Perdana and Maxwell, 2004; Sumarto, Usman, Mawardi, and Montgomery, 1998).
15The results based on propensity-score-matching and village xed eects show no signicant eects on a
number of outcomes, such as labor supply and household expenditure (Molyneaux and Gertler, 1999). Using a
dierent matching method that utilizes the dierential probability of funding across provinces, Alatas (2000)
nds the positive eects in rural areas on household consumption, self-employment activities among spouses,
and work among children. However, once province-level xed eects are incorporated, no eect is found for
consumption, and the results for labor supply are not reported. Interviews conducted in six provinces also
indicate that participants there found that IDT loan activities were not very protable (Badan Pusat Statistik
(BPS), 1997).
16Larger per capita grants are correlated with a decline or slower growth in within-province inequality (Akita
and Szeto, 2000). Larger per household grants are associated with disproportionate increases in the village-
level average income and consumption given initial economic infrastructure (Yamauchi, 2008). No impact is
found for the incidence of child labor (Yamauchi, 2007). Also, in an overview of major anti-poverty credit
programs in the 1990s, Sumarto et al. (1998) conclude that IDT was relatively 
exible and loan management
responsibility shared among beneciaries encouraged production activities.
7combine these datasets, and focus on rural areas, which include most funded villages.17
Targeting measures are based on the poverty level and program benets of a household.
First, the household poverty level is dened by predicted household per capita expenditure
(PCE). The predicted PCE is used because actual PCE could be changed as a result of
receiving IDT loans.18 I use 1993 and 1994 SUSENAS to regress PCE on provincial xed eects
and a number of household characteristics.19 Applying the coecients from this regression
to the same variables in the 1996 and 1997 SUSENAS, I predict the PCE that is likely to
proxy the poverty level not aected by the program.20 Second, program benets are measured
by a household's eligibility, receipt of a loan, and loan size. The 1996 and 1997 SUSENAS
asks whether anyone in a household has ever been a member of a community group for IDT
(members are eligible for a loan), whether that person has received an IDT loan, and if so,
the year of receipt and the yearly cumulative loan size.21 The panel data on the distribution
17I do not pool rural and urban areas because they faced distinct criteria for the identication of poor
communities, and are likely to have dierent sets of unobserved community attributes. The PODES and the
IDT data are combined with the SUSENAS based on the village ID. The share of rural villages that are
matched is 90% for 1996 and 89% for 1997.
18Also, expenditure, rather than wealth, is used to indicate household poverty levels because the SUSENAS
does not contain information on assets except for housing. The retrospective information on consumption or
income is also unavailable.
19See Appendix Table 2 for the results, and Appendix Table 1[B] for the summary statistics for household-
level characteristics.
20The predicted PCE explains 80% of the variation in the actual PCE, and correctly assigns 81% and 74%
of households in the rst one and two quintiles within each village in the 1993 and 1994 SUSENAS. The
household-level variables included in this exercise are unlikely to be changed by the program. For example,
benets were unlikely to be spent on educational attainment of household heads who were, on average, 43
years old. Though benets could be spent on housing improvement or to accommodate additional household
members, based on the identication strategy used in Yamauchi (2008), the eects of IDT on household
size and composition are insignicant, except only for a decrease in the fraction of children aged 0-4. The
eects on three housing quality indicators also show insignicant changes. While another indicator shows an
improvement, two other indicators exhibit deteriorations, suggesting that these changes are unlikely to be due
to IDT.
21Reported participation included a case where the household directly received loans and a case where the
community group received grants and the household was a member of the group at the time of the survey.
In the latter case, the grant value per group member was reported as the loan size (SUSENAS 1996, Manual
IIIA). These two cases are indistinguishable. Though the data indicates that loan size does not vary among
participants in about 15% of the sample villages, this could be the result of allocating loans of the same
size. To the extent that the latter type of reporting took place and relatively wealthier households among
the group kept a larger share, the targeting measures based on this information are overestimated. Thus, the
8of beneciaries and benets are created using this information.22
In order to measure targeting performance, I use (1) the degree to which relatively poor
households receive benets and (2) the share of benets accruing to relatively poor households.
The degree of targeting is estimated by the coecient of the household poverty level in the
regression of household-level benets. A negative coecient indicates a tendency to target
the poor. I further investigate how the coecient diers across villages with various initial
conditions.23 The other set of targeting measures indicates the concentration of beneciaries
and benets among relatively poor households. These measures facilitate the graphical il-
lustration and decomposition analysis of distributional outcomes (Coady and Scouas, 2004;
Duclos, Makdissi, and Wodon, 2005).
3.2 Targeting: Overall, Inter- and within-village Allocation
Overall, IDT benets are more likely to be provided to relatively poor households. At the end
of the program, the share of eligible households was 33 percent, and the share of households
that had received a loan was 28 percent for the rst (poorest) decile (Fig.1A). The respective
gures for the 10th (richest) decile are six and ve percent. However, among loan recipient
households, the poorer received smaller loans (Fig.1B). Altogether, the distribution of the
average loan size including non-participants, or the unconditional loan size, exhibit a nega-
tive slope, suggesting that the pro-poor distribution of beneciaries dominates the pro-rich
estimated targeting measures could be seen as the upper bound. Also, if such a measurement error occurred
more often in villages with a particular characteristic, a true decline in targeting performance associated with
that characteristic is not fully detected. Thus, if signicant dierences are found, they are likely to serve as the
lower bound in the gap in targeting performance. The questionnaire and other documentation are available
at http : ==www:rand:org=labor=bps:data=webdocs=susenas=susenasmain:htm
22Households in the 1996 SUSENAS report loans extended in 1994 and 1995, and those in the 1997 SUSENAS
report loans extended in 1994-1996. Information on the year in which a household became eligible for IDT
loans is unavailable, thus the information on eligibility is used only in the cross-section analysis.
23Similar strategies are used in Alderman (2002) and Jayne et al. (2001, 2002).
9distribution of conditional loan size. Consistently, the distribution of the share of partici-
pants shows a larger deviation from the distribution that would be realized under universal
distribution (depicted by the 45 degree line as a benchmark) compared to the distribution of
the share of loan money (Fig.1C). The bottom 40 percent of the PCE distribution received
53 percent of the benets. This amounts to a 32% increase compared to their share under
universal provision (40 percent). The equivalent gure for the distribution of beneciaries is
50%. These numbers are comparable to the median achievement among programs that adopt
similar targeting schemes: the gures are 40% for community-based targeting and 33% for
geographic targeting (Coady et al., 2004).
The overall distribution of IDT benets can be decomposed into an inter- and within-village
allocation. I dene households who are in villages that have been funded at least once to be
potential beneciaries. Similarly, I dene per household grant value (the total grant value
divided by the 1993 number of households in the village) as the potential benet value. While
the distribution of actual beneciaries/benets indicates the result of both inter- and intra-
village selection, the distribution of potential beneciaries/benets re
ects only the result of
inter-village selection. The ratio of the shares of potential and actual beneciaries indicates
that poorer households are more likely to not only be included in IDT villages, but also to
be selected as a beneciary within IDT villages (Fig.2A). However, this pattern is not found
in the distribution of benets. The distribution of the average unconditional loan size and
the distribution of the average potential benet value mostly match each other (Fig.2B). This
suggests that the pro-poor distribution of beneciaries within IDT villages is oset by the pro-
rich distribution of loan size conditional on receipt. The concentration curves (Fig.2C) also
indicate that the selection of IDT villages contributes to overall targeting.24 The selection of
24The distribution of potential benet value however does not show a further contribution. That is, condi-
tional on grant receipt, the per household grant value does not vary across deciles. This is consistent with the
10actual beneciaries exhibits a further contribution; however, this is almost completely oset by
the pro-rich distribution of loan size among beneciaries. As a result, the overall distribution
of loan money closely matches the distributions of potential beneciaries and benets for the
rst four deciles.
These results provide an indication that villages contribute to overall targeting in terms of
beneciaries, though not in terms of benets. The analysis so far has not taken into account
the fact that households from one village could be included in one decile. In order to focus on
within-village targeting, the exercise is repeated using the predicted PCE that is standardized
within each village. Both the non-parametric and linear relationships demonstrate that the
probability of participating in IDT increases by six percent as a household's relative poverty
level decreases (Fig.3A).25 As a result, 45 percent of beneciaries are concentrated among the
bottom 40 percent of the relative PCE distribution (Fig.3C). On the other hand, loan size does
not vary much within a funded village (Fig.3B). This suggests that the pro-rich distribution of
conditional loan size (Fig.1B) is due to larger loans provided in wealthier IDT villages. With
no within-village variation in conditional loan size, unconditional loan size and the relative
poverty level show a negative relationship. Since this merely re
ects the pro-poor distribution
of participants, the concentration curves for beneciaries and benets completely coincide
(Fig.3C). These results conrm that there is a contribution of community-based targeting
towards overall targeting, and most of the contribution arises from the selection of beneciaries.
However, once benets are broken down by the year of receipt, the concentration curves show
that targeting deteriorated over time (Fig.3D), particularly for the poorest quintile.26
fact that village size is not highly correlated with the PCE level.
25The relationships for the probability of being eligible indicate a very similar pattern. The similarity between
linear and non-linear estimation also suggests that the linear specication used in the following analysis is a
reasonable approximation.
26The distribution of the share of beneciaries shows the same pattern of changes.
114 Empirical Strategy
4.1 Overall Benets
I next explore which village characteristics are correlated with overall targeting before inves-
tigating which characteristics are associated with changes in targeting performance.27 Two
specications are utilized which extend the descriptive analysis based on the coverage of rela-
tively poor households and the concentration of program resources. The rst specication is
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The outcome variable, Yij, denotes benets for a household i in village j. It includes a
dummy variable indicating eligibility or a loan provided at some point between 1994 and 1996.
The cumulative value of loans extended during this time period is also used. Parameter H
0
indicates the baseline degree of targeting, or the correlation between the outcome and the
household's relative poverty level within the village, Xij. Parameter H
1 allows the degree of
targeting to dier across villages depending on their pre-program characteristics, Vj. With
the village-level xed eects, H
j , these parameters estimate the correlation net of possible
across-village additive dierences in the level of benets. For example, village xed eects
absorb dierences in the participation rate common within a village for relatively poor and
wealthy households, which might arise from the heterogeneous preference of village ocials
27The concentration measures indicate a large variation. On one hand, no eligibility (actual participation
or loan money) was allocated to the bottom 40 percent of households in 8 (10) percent of targeted villages.
On the other hand, all eligibility (participation or loan money) was invested in the bottom 40 percent in 7 (8)
percent of the villages. Distributions better than universal allocation are found in 40 (43) percent of villages
in terms of eligibility (participation or loan money). This concentration of extreme mistargeting is analogous
to the high concentration of the incidence of missing rice under Indonesia's OPK program (Olken, 2006).
12over wide coverage versus large benet per recipient. In addition, it is possible that the
selection of poor villages is correlated with unobserved factors that aect targeting (Galasso
and Ravallion, 2005). This is controlled by a set of variables characterizing the selection
process, Dj, interacted with the household's relative poverty level.28 The error term, H
ij, is
assumed to be independent across villages.
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The outcome variable is the share of overall benets (cumulative loan value) or bene-
ciaries (dened by eligibility or participation) accruing to relatively poor households, with
predicted PCE falling in the bottom 20 or 40 percent, in village j in province p. The pa-
rameter of interest, V
1 , indicates the correlation between these concentration measures and
pre-existing village conditions. Similarly to Eq.(1), the village selection process is controlled
by including Djp. The province-level dummies are also included.29 Note that, under these two
methods based on equations (1) and (2), dierent changes in benet allocation are considered
as targeting-neutral. While Eq. (1) takes a constant additive change as neutral, Eq. (2)
takes a proportional change as neutral (See Appendix 1). The following analysis focuses on
village characteristics that are consistently related to targeting performance under the two
specications.
28Dj includes the 1993 and 1994 dierences between the village score and the provincial threshold, which
represents the propensity to be funded. It also includes a dummy variable that indicates a village where
funding status in 1993 depended on a eld ocer's subjective evaluation. Two additional dummy variables
are included to indicate villages selected for funding based on the 1994 and 1995 criteria. Another dummy
variable indicates villages that were once funded, but dropped out of the funding list in 1995 or 1996. Finally,
the last dummy variable indicates villages funded in 1993 or 1994 despite the village selection rules suggesting
no funding. Other types of errors are too rare to be included.
29Conditional logit model and Tobit model (with the censoring at zero and one) are conducted for equations
(1) and (2), respectively. These non-linear specications yield qualitatively consistent results.
134.2 Initial Local Conditions and Targeting
Possible pathways through which dierent initial local conditions aect community-based
targeting can be illustrated in the village-level welfare maximization framework. Suppose that
village ocials try to maximize the weighted utility of relatively poor and wealthy households.
For simplicity, I call them the poor and non-poor.30 First, the eect of inequality is unclear.
On one hand, inequality can increase the gap in the marginal utility levels between the poor
and non-poor from receiving an IDT loan, providing ocials with an incentive to concentrate
program resources to the poor. On the other hand, inequality may tilt the relative weight
on the utility in favor of the non-poor. In addition, the relative importance of these factors
could change if benets provided to the poor empower them or leakage satiates the demand
from the non-poor. This issue is explored using two indicators of inequality in consumption
and education levels: the coecient of variation of the predicted PCE31 and education Gini
index.32
Second, the human capital of village heads and administrative capability of village govern-
ment can enhance better targeting if they are correlated with relatively equal weights on the
utilities of the poor and non-poor and more accurate information on the marginal utility from
receiving an IDT loan. The human capital of village heads is measured by their educational
attainment conditional on their cohort,33 and the technical competency of village government,
30The discussion in this section follows the model used in Galasso and Ravallion (2005).
31The inequality measure and the average poverty level are based on the predicted PCE of surveyed house-
holds, which are not representative at the village level. Possible measurement errors in these variables are
likely to create the attenuation bias. This strengthens the view that, if signicant dierences are observed
across villages, they are likely to be interpreted as the lower bound. This is true for the share of household
heads who completed primary education and the education gini index. All the other village characteristics are
based on the 1993 PODES or IDT administrative data.
32To measure inequality in educational attainment, I follow Thomas, Wang, and Fan (2001) using six educa-
tional attainment categories: none, some primary education, completed primary education, junior secondary
education, senior secondary education, and higher education. (See Appendix Table 1[C] for the summary
statistics of village characteristics).
33Younger village heads are more likely to have completed higher levels of education. In order to separate
14LKMD, is measured by their self-reported capacity.34 Measures are also included for the
pre-existence of social organizations such as groups of farmers, health/nutrition advisors, and
agricultural extension workers.
Third, the marginal utility from receiving IDT loans is likely to be higher if returns to
investment are higher and the pre-existing supply of credit is scarce. These conditions may
also reduce the gap in the marginal utility levels among the poor and non-poor. This possibility
is tested using the dummy variables indicating villages with and without three types of credit
institutions: banks, cooperatives, and past public credit programs. Dummies are also included
indicating local investment environments such as having no land access to outside the village,
road conditions among villages with land access, and access to public transportation and
communication facilities.
Fourth, a smaller budget size can hinder targeting if allocation to the non-poor is priori-
tized. This issue is assessed using the across-village variation in per household grant size. This
variation arises because the same value of lump-sum grant was given to all selected villages
regardless of population size. Thus, while controlling for dierent funding history, I am able
to estimate the correlation between the budget size and targeting performance.35
the cohort eect from the education eect, I dene relatively educated village heads by age group. Thus, the
interaction between age dummies and education dummy indicates, given the village head's age group, whether
the head's exposure to relatively higher education is associated with targeting performance.
34LKMD is the national institution operating at the village level. It was created in the beginning of the 1980s
as a vehicle to implement national programs for villages. Its members are usually local residents, appointed by
the village head (Antlov, 2003). The PODES asks whether the LKMD in each village (1) does not exist, (2)
only exists in very basic form, (3) exists and is able to develop and conduct work projects utilizing grants from
the central government matched with contributions of community members, or (4) exists and forms village
development plans, keeps reports in order, and has well-functioning sections. In order to reduce the eect of
subjective evaluation, I dene a village in (3) or (4) as a village with relative technical competence. Since the
form of LKMD originally developed in Java and was later put in place in other regions, I allow the correlation
with targeting performance to vary in and outside Java.
35I also include two dummy variables indicating villages that recently experienced negative income shocks
such as natural disasters and epidemics, to see whether they show poorer targeting due to the need to assist
wealthier households in transient poverty. Information on religion and ethnicity is unavailable.
155 Results on Overall Targeting Performance
The average degree of targeting36 indicates that an increase in the relative poverty level is
associated with a 6.4 (5.8) percent lower probability of being eligible for (participating in)
IDT (Table 1), conrming the results found in Fig.3. It is also correlated with a Rp.27,796
smaller loan size.37 The mean concentration measures suggest that 24 percent and 45 percent
of benets/beneciaries accrue to the bottom rst and second quintiles (Appendix Table
1[A]). Compared to universal allocation, therefore, the within-village distribution contributes
to concentrating benets to relatively poor households by 20% and 13%.
Among the list of village characteristics, the major correlates of better targeting are the
average level of predicted PCE and its inequality. First, as the average PCE increases by one
standard deviation (Rp.10,375), a marginally poorer household is 0.01 percent more likely to
be eligible as well as to be participating. The household also receives Rp.7,470 larger benets
unconditional on loan receipt (Table 1). These changes amount to 18-27% of the average
degree of targeting. Consistently, a marginal decrease in the average PCE is associated with a
decline of 0.3-0.4 percent in the share of benets accruing to relatively poor households (Table
2). One reason for these results may be that all households are considered deserving in poorer
villages. Nine percent of the relatively poor half of the villages had all the households eligible
and 6 percent had all the households receiving a loan. The equivalent gures are 4 percent
and 3 percent among the relatively wealthy half of the villages.
Second, one standard deviation increase in the coecient of variation in the predicted PCE
36This is computed as H
0 +H
1   V +H
2   D, shown in the rst row, based on the estimates for H
0 (in the
second row) and for H
1 and H
2 (in the rest of the rows) in Eq.(1).
37When household characteristics are used instead of the relative poverty level, the results show that house-
holds are more likely to receive loans if they have less educated heads, many more members, higher shares
of women and children, and housing made of inferior materials. Households headed by older males are more
likely to receive larger loans (Appendix Table 3).
16is accompanied by a 0.02 percent increase in the degree of targeting in terms of eligibility
and participation and a Rp. 6,804 increase in terms of the unconditional loan value. This
is equivalent to a 19-26% improvement relative to the average degree of targeting (Table 1).
Interestingly, the results in Table 2 suggest that it is households in the second, and not the rst,
quintile who beneted the most from greater inequality. One standard deviation increase in
the inequality measure is associated with a 1.3 percent larger share of benets for the poorest
group, which is positive, yet only half of the 2.6 percent increase for the second poorest.
These results suggest that the inequality in the living standard may help village ocials to
dierentiate households in the second poorest quintile from households in the third quintile or
above, which could be more dicult in more equal villages. On the other hand, the poorest
group is more likely to be included in beneciaries regardless of the level of within-village
inequality.
Though information on wealth inequality is unavailable in the SUSENAS, the results on
inequality in educational attainment suggest a similar tendency: unequal villages exhibit
better targeting in terms of the unconditional loan value (Table 1), which mainly benets
households in the second bottom quintile (Table 2). Altogether, these results suggest that
ease of identifying the poor and justifying their needs could possibly overwhelm the larger
political in
uence of local elites in more unequal communities.38 These ndings on the levels
of poverty and inequality are consistent with the cross-country study by Coady et al. (2004).39
These results, which are not in line with previous anecdotal evidence, might re
ect Indone-
38These results also provide an indication that consideration of protability is unlikely to be a major cause
of poor targeting. For if this was the case, inequality in education, which could be correlated with inequality
in creditworthiness and entrepreneurship, should be associated with poorer targeting.
39Similar results are obtained when alternative inequality measures are used, such as Gini coecient and
the share of the top 20% of the predicted PCE distribution. This nding contrasts with Galasso and Ravallion
(2005), who nd a negative association between targeting and inequality in landholding. However, their
denition of the poor (based on the national poverty level) makes it dicult to directly compare the two sets
of results.
17sia's political context. In the Suharto regime, village heads had incentives to look to upper-level
government because they needed district-level government approval to run for village election,
and were held accountable to the sub-district government once elected.40 Properly executing
national programs was one way to show their capability and loyalty to the members of this
upper-level government (Antlov, 1995; Husken, 1994). For example, Antlov (1995) reports
that a village leader tried to increase participation in a literacy program to make him look
competent to sub-district ocials. Under IDT, the list of participants was reported to the
upper-level government, which in turn submitted the information to the provincial and cen-
tral government. Village heads might have used this list to demonstrate their achievement in
following the national guideline to target the poor.
The other major concern about the eectiveness of community-based targeting lies in the
capability of local agents who are responsible for the allocation of program resources. However,
the level of self-reported administrative capacity of village government is not correlated with
the targeting outcomes. Also, no clear performance gap is found among villages headed by
persons with dierent age and education levels. Though the results indicate a signicant gap
among the younger cohort of village heads between the educated and less educated, neither
of them exhibit a signicant dierence compared to the omitted group of village heads aged
48 and above who have not completed junior high school.
The other village characteristics show an association with targeting performance based
on only one of the two specications, most likely re
ecting the methodological dierences
described in Appendix 1. For example, the household-level analysis indicates that better
targeting is found in villages with a larger budget per household and previous program receipt,
while villages dropped out of the funding list show worse targeting (Table 1). On the other
40The eectiveness of top-down monitoring in Indonesia is also shown in Olken (2007).
18hand, only the village-level analysis results suggest that better targeting is found in villages
with public transportation and a post oce, while worse performance is observed in places
with banks and agricultural/health advisors (Table 2).41 Other characteristics such as density
and past experience of shocks do not exhibit a signicant association with targeting.42
6 Changes in Targeting Performance
6.1 Yearly Benets
Thus far, the analysis has focused on the allocation of cumulative benets. This section inves-
tigates changes in the yearly benet distribution, and their association with initial conditions.
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0 show whether there are common yearly changes in the degree of
targeting from the benchmark year, 1994. Key parameters 
H
1 and H
1 test for the similar
41Though the village-level analysis uses a subset of villages where at least one household is participating in
the village-level analysis, the dierences in the results are not due to the dierences in the sample. Using the
sample of villages that are used in the village-level analysis does not change the substantive results based on
the household-level analysis (See Appendix 2).
42Proximity to the regional center is not included in the regressions as it shows few signicant eects and
no systematic pattern across regions. The exclusion of these factors does not alter the qualitative results.
19changes particularly for villages with characteristics indicated by Vj. With the village-level
xed eects and the controls for village selection, Dj, these parameters are identied from the
changes within villages, not from the compositional changes in the sample.43 The village-level


















Now the village-level analysis also includes the village-level xed eects. Thus, the cor-
relation between the outcome and village characteristics in the base year (1994) cannot be




2 , indicate whether changes in the concentration
of program resources are correlated with initial local conditions. The error term is allowed to
have the village-level clustering.44
6.2 Results on Changes in Targeting Performance
The results of estimating Eq.(3) conrm that the average degree of targeting declined (Table
3).45 In 1994, a marginally poor household was 3 percent more likely to be a beneciary and
expected to receive Rp.9,384 (Column 1). These gures fell to 2 percent and Rp.5,285 in
1995, and 1 percent and Rp. 2,179 in 1996 (Columns 2-3). Though inaccurately estimated,
the year eects estimated in Eq.(4) consistently indicate declines in the shares of beneciaries
43In addition, in order to control for possible dierences in the outcomes between the two survey years, I
include the dummy variable indicating households observed in 1997, as well as its interaction with the relative
poverty level. The results show that households in 1997 are more likely to receive benets and achieve better
targeting.
44Conditional logit estimation of Eq. (3) and Tobit estimation of Eq. (4) with provincial dummies result
in qualitatively same conclusions. The within estimator and rst-dierence estimator for Eq.(4) also yield
consistent results.
45The average degree of targeting for the benchmark year is calculated as H
0 +H
1   V +H
2   D, its change




1   V + 
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2   D(H
0 + H
1   V + H
2   D).
20and benets accruing to relatively poor households (Table 4). The results also conrm greater
reductions for the poorest quintile.
One of the main ndings is that the deterioration in targeting was not concentrated in
wealthier or unequal villages. Higher levels of average PCE and inequality in the PCE are
correlated with better targeting of relatively poor households in 1994, and this advantage does
not change over time (Table 3). The village-level analysis results consistently indicate the lack
of changes in the association between targeting and the levels of poverty and inequality.
Contrastingly, targeting relatively deteriorates in villages with higher human capital of
village heads (Table 3). That is, villages with young and educated heads provided more loan
opportunities to the relatively poor in 1994, even compared to the omitted group. However,
this advantage disappeared in 1995 and 1996. The village-level analysis suggests consistent
changes between 1994 and 1995 (Table 4). It also reveals that the share of benets declines
particularly for the bottom quintile. These results suggest that overall within-village targeting
declined because the successful performance, associated with young and educated village heads,
did not last.
These results are likely to re
ect the fact that monitoring of loan allocations became
more dicult for village heads in later years - once eligible households were selected, com-
munity groups, not village heads, became responsible for loan management. Thus, young
and educated heads may have played a role in ensuring eligibility for the poorest, but not
in continuously providing loan opportunities to them. While the mechanism through which
these heads demonstrate this temporary achievement is unclear from the empirical results,
Indonesia's historical context provides one possible explanation. As discussed above, village
heads had incentives to build a reputation as good implementers of national programs. Among
them, young and educated heads often replaced traditional, inward-looking village heads in
21the 1980s, and were particularly loyal to the central government (Antlov, 1995; Husken, 1994).
This historical background suggests the results re
ect the stronger loyalty and administration
skills of young and educated heads. On the other hand, it is also possible that they simply
had a stronger preference for a more democratic selection.46 The results do not allow deter-
mination of the specic pathways through which the age and education levels of village heads
aect targeting performance.
Similar results are found for village government in Java with self-reported administrative
competency (Table 3). These village governments better target their own poor in the initial
year, but this advantage dissipates towards the end of the program period.47 However, the
village-level analysis results do not show a consistent pattern.
Finally, the household-level analysis indicates that a larger budget is associated with a
higher degree of targeting, but the degree does not improve as additional funding is provided
(Tables 3).48 The overall positive relationship is consistent with the previous ndings (Lanjouw
and Ravallion, 1999). However, the lack of change in the relationship indicates that the eect
of a budget cut and a budget increase may not be the same (Ravallion, 1999). The results
for other variables (not reported) suggest that villages included for funding in 1995 and 1996
had poor targeting performance for the years in which they were not yet funded (as no one is
a beneciary). Once they became funded, however, they target better than the average. On
the other hand, villages that dropped out of the funding list worsened targeting performance
in the last year of the program period, possibly re
ecting capture, but also the overall decline
46Rao and Ibanez (2003) discuss \benevolent capture," in which in
uential individuals dominate community-
level decision-making, but consider the best interests of the community.
47The fact that this positive association between targeting and administrative capability is found only in
Java might be because among the villages dened as \capable" in Java, a larger fraction is categorized in the
most organized group.
48Note that, with the controls for funding history, the estimates for each year re
ect the relative budget
size among funded villages. Therefore, the lack of change in the degree of targeting suggests that it does not
depend on the range of grant values for which the yearly estimates are obtained.
22in the number of beneciaries. Other initial conditions provide little signicant, systematic
association with targeting.49
7 Conclusions
Given the growing popularity in community-based development and resource allocation, the
ability for poor communities to implement social programs has never been more critical. This
paper has investigated the initial local conditions associated with community-based targeting
performance using Indonesia's anti-poverty program, IDT. Using the rich information on pre-
program conditions, I have shown that wealthier and more unequal villages tend to provide
more resources to relatively poor households within the village. Exploiting the panel data on
targeting performance, I have also demonstrated that wealthier and unequal villages constantly
target well. These results suggest that, though there is much concern about local capture
in communities with large inequality, the ease of identifying the poor could overwhelm the
possibly larger political in
uence of local elites. I also nd that young and educated heads are
more likely to achieve better targeting, though only in the initial year. This is likely to have
contributed to the better initial overall targeting and the deterioration afterwards.
The lack of the evidence for elite capture may look inconsistent with the previous anec-
dotal evidence. However, recent empirical studies do not always nd a negative relationship
between targeting and inequality (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006; Coady et al., 2004). Hence,
my ndings, in light of the previous research, suggest that the relationship between inequality
and targeting might also be specic to local and program contexts. The nature of IDT benets
49For instance, only the village-level analysis results indicate that villages with land access to outside vil-
lage improve concentrating benets to the second bottom quintiles. Density is associated with a temporary
deterioration of targeting, while the fraction of educated heads and the pre-existence of a farmers' association
are correlated with a temporary improvement.
23(loans) as a private good might be attributable to the positive relationship between inequal-
ity and targeting (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006).50 Indonesia's political context suggests
that village leaders, particularly young, educated ones, had incentives to follow the national
guideline of targeting the poor.
The disappearance of the initially positive correlation between targeting and young, edu-
cated heads is likely to re
ect the fact that, once eligibility was allocated, community groups
became responsible for actual loan management. This suggests that possible gain from more
loyal or benevolent local agents could be tapered without continued monitoring of benet
allocations by them. These ndings in turn give rise to questions such as whether community-
based targeting could generally be improved by training village heads and ocials, modifying
program design and instructions, and strengthening monitoring by upper-level government and
local agents.51 Establishing empirical evidence on these issues from a broad range of settings
is likely to enhance utilization of local knowledge and implementation of community-based
social programs.
50Olken (2007) points to the possibility that citizens monitor government compensation of labor more care-
fully than they do the procurement of capital (which is close to a public good).
51Olken (2007, 2008) addresses these issues in the context of corruption and project choice based on the
sample of Indonesian villages from two provinces. Ravallion (2000) shows the eects of monitoring and budget
expansion for Argentina.
24References
Akita, T. and J. Szeto (2000). Inpres desa tertinggal (IDT) program and indonesian regional inequality. Asian
Economic Journal 14(2), 167{86.
Alatas, V. (2000). Evaluating the Left Behind Villages Program in Indonesia: Exploiting Rules to Identify
Eects on Employment and Expenditures. Ph. D. thesis, Princeton University.
Alderman, H. (2002). Do local ocials know something we don't? Decentralization of targeted transfers in
Albania. Journal of Public Economics 83, 375{404.
Antlov, H. (1995). Exemplary Centre, Administrative Periphery: Rural Leadership and the New Order in Java.
Curzon Press.
Antlov, H. (2003). Village government and rural development in indonesia: The new democratic framework.
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 39(2), 193{214.
Araujo, C., F. Ferreira, P. Lanjouw, and B. Ozler (2006). Local inequality and project choice: theory and
evidence from eduador. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3997.
Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) (1994). IDT Program Implementation Guidance. National Development Planning
Agency, Ministry of Home Aairs.
Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) (1995). Identication of Poor Village. National Development Planning Agency,
Ministry of Home Aairs.
Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) (1997). Pilot Studi Pendataan Kelompok Masyarakat: Dalam Rangka Evaluasi
Analisis Dampak Program Inpres Desa Tertinggal (IDT), 1996. National Development Planning Agency,
Ministry of Home Aairs.
Baker, J. and M. Grosh (1994). Poverty reduction through geograhic targeting: How well does it work? World
Development 22(7), 983{995.
Bardhan, P. and D. Mookherjee (2000). Capture and governance at local and national levels. American
Economic Review 90(2), 135{139.
Bardhan, P. and D. Mookherjee (2005). Decentralizing antipoverty program delivery in developing countries.
Journal of Public Economics 89, 675{704.
Bardhan, P. and D. Mookherjee (2006). Pro-poor targeting and accountability of local governments in West
Bengal. Journal of Development Economics 79, 303{327.
Bigman, D., S. Dercon, D. Guillaume, and M. Lambotte (2000). Community targeting for poverty reduction
in burkina faso. World Bank Economic Review 14, 167{193.
Bigman, D. and Srinivasan (2002). Geographical targeting of poverty alleviation programs: methodology and
applications. Journal of Policy Modeling 24, 237{255.
Booth, A. (1994). Repelita VI and the second long-term development plan. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic
Studies 30(3), 3{39.
25Coady, D. (2006). The welfare returns to ner targeting: the case of the progresa program in mexico. Inter-
national Tax and Public Finance 13, 217{239.
Coady, D., M. Grosh, and J. Hoddinott (2004). Targeting outcomes redux. World Bank Research Ob-
server 19(1), 61{85.
Coady, D. and E. Scouas (2004). On the targeting and redistributive eciencies of alternative transfer
instruments. Review of Income and Wealth 50(1), 11{27.
Conning, J. and M. Kevane (2002). Community-based targeting mechanisms for social safety nets: A critical
review. World Development 30(3), 375{394.
Crook, R. and J. Manor (1998). Democracy and Decentralisation in South Asia and West Africa: Participation,
Accountability, and Performance. Cambridge University Press.
Daimon, T. (2001). The spatial dimension of welfare and poverty: Lessons from a regional targeting programme
in indonesia. Asian Economic Journal 15(4), 345{67.
Daley, A. and G. Fane (2002). Anti-poverty programs in indonesia. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 38,
309{31.
Dreze, J. and A. Sen (1989). Hunger and Public Action. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Duclos, J.-Y., P. Makdissi, and Q. Wodon (2005). Poverty-dominant program reforms: the role of targeting
and allocation rules. Journal of Development Economics 77, 53{73.
Elbers, C., T. Fujii, P. Landouw, B. Ozler, and W. Yin (2007). Poverty alleviation through geographic
targeting: How much does disaggregation help? Journal of Development Economics 83, 197{213.
Faguet, J.-P. (2004). Does decentralization increase government responsiveness to local needs? Evidence from
Bolivia. Journal of Public Economics 88, 867{893.
Galasso, E. and M. Ravallion (2005). Decentralized targeting of an antipoverty program. Journal of Public
Economics 89, 705{727.
Glewwe, P. (1992). Targeting assistance to the poor: Ecient allocation of transfers when household income
is not observed. Journal of Development Economics 38, 297{321.
Husken, F. (1994). Village elections in central Java: State control or local democracy? In H. Antlov and
S. Cederroth (Eds.), Leadership on Java: Gentle Hints, Authoritarian Rule. Curzon Press.
Jayne, T., J. Strauss, T. Yamano, and D. Molla (2001). Giving to the poor? targeting of food aid in rural
Ethiopia. World Development 29(5), 887{910.
Jayne, T., J. Strauss, T. Yamano, and D. Molla (2002). Targeting of food aid in rural Ethiopia: chronic need
or inertia? Journal of Development Economics 68, 247{288.
Johnson, C., P. Deshingkar, and D. Start (2005). Grounding the state: Devolution and development in India's
panchayats. Journal of Development Studies 41(6), 937{70.
Lanjouw, P. and M. Ravallion (1999). Benet incidence, public spending reforms, and the timing of program
capture. World Bank Economic Review 13(2), 257{73.
26Mansuri, G. and V. Rao (2004). Community-based and -driven development: a critical review. World bank
Research Observer 19(1), 1{39.
Molyneaux, J. and P. Gertler (1999). Evaluating program impact: A case study of poverty alleviation in
indonesia. mimeo.
Olken, B. (2006). Corruption and the costs of redistribution: Micro evidence from Indoneisa. Journal of Public
Economics 90, 853{870.
Olken, B. A. (2007). Monitoring corruption: Evidence from a eld experiment in indonesia. Journal of Political
Economy 115(2), 200{249. April.
Olken, B. A. (2008). Direct democracy and local public goods: Evidence from a eld experiment in indonesia.
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 14123.
Park, A., S. Wang, and G. Wu (2002). Regional poverty targeting in China. Journal of Public Economics 86,
123{153.
Parry, T. R. (1997). Achieving balance in decentralization: A case study of education decentralization in Chile.
World Development 25(2), 211{25.
Perdana, A. A. and J. Maxwell (2004). Poverty targeting in indonesia: Programs, problems and lessons
learned. CSIS Economics Working Paper Series WPE083, Centre for Strategic and International Studies,
Jakarta, Indonesia, March.
Rao, V. and A. M. Ibanez (2003). The social impact of social funds in jamaica: A mixed-methods analysis
of participation, targeting, and collective action in community-driven development. World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper 2970.
Ravallion, M. (1999). Who is protected from budget cuts? Theory and evidence for Argentina. The World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2391.
Ravallion, M. (2000). Monitoring targeting performance when decentralized allocations to the poor are unob-
served. World Bank Economic Review 14(2), 331{345.
Rosenzweig, M. and A. Foster (2003). Democratization, decentralization and the distribution of local public
goods in a poor rural economy. BREAD Working Paper 10.
Schady, N. (2002). Picking the poor: indicators for geographic targeting in peru. Review of income and
wealth 48(3), 417{433.
Skouas, E., B. Davis, and S. de la Vega (2001). Targeting the poor in Mexico: An evaluation of the selection
of households into PROGRESA. World Development 29(10), 1769{84.
Stifel, D. and H. Alderman (2005). Targeting at the margin: the `Glass of Milk' subsidy programme in Peru.
Journal of Development Studies 41(5), 839{864.
Sumarto, S., S. Usman, S. Mawardi, and R. Montgomery (1998). Agriculture's role in poverty reduction:
bringing farmers to the policy formulation process. ADB TA 2660-INO, STUDY B-4.
Thomas, V., Y. Wang, and X. Fan (2001). Measuring education inequality: Gini coecients of education.
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2525.
27Wade, R. (1997). How infrastructure agencies motivate sta: Canal irrigation in India and the Republic of
Korea. In A. Mody (Ed.), Infrastructure Strategies in East Asia: The Untold Story. Washington, D.C.:
Economic Development Institute of the World Bank.
World Bank (2000). World Development Report: Entering the 21st Century. Washington, D.C.
World Bank (2004). World Development Report: Making Services Work For Poor People.
World Bank (2006). Making the New Indonesia Work for the Poor.
Yamauchi, C. (2007). Can capital investment relieve children from labor? Conse-
quences of poverty alleviation program in Indonesia. Australian National University,
http://econrsss.anu.edu.au/Sta/yamauchi/research cy.htm.
Yamauchi, C. (2008). Heterogeneity in the returns to investment in poor villages. Centre for Economics Policy
Research Discussion Paper 582.
28Figure 1: Distribution of overall IDT beneficiaries and benefits by decile of predicted per capita 
expenditure (PCE) (1997, Rural Indonesian villages) 
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Sources: 1997 SUSENAS and IDT data.  
Notes:  
-  Households are divided into deciles based on the predicted real household per capita expenditure (PCE). 
See Section 3 for details of the prediction procedure. PCE and loan size are in terms of 1995 Jakarta 
prices. 
-  Participating households are defined as households having received an IDT loan at least once.  
-  Loan size is the cumulative amount of money lent to a household over the program period. 
-  In Fig.1B, the loan value for non-recipients is assumed to be zero. 
-  Fig.1C shows the cumulative share of participating households (beneficiaries) with different levels of 
predicted PCE as well as the share of loan money (benefits) accruing to households with different levels 
of predicted PCE. The straight line indicates the allocation that would be realized under universal 
provision. 
 
29Figure 2: Decomposition of inter- and intra-village distribution of IDT beneficiaries and benefits 
by decile of predicted PCE (1997, Rural Indonesian villages) 
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Sources: 1997 SUSENAS and IDT data.   
Notes: 
-  See the notes for Figure 1 for the definitions of predicted household PCE, participation, and loan size. 
- In Fig.2A, potential beneficiaries are defined as households (including non-participants) living in villages 
that were funded at least once. The distribution of potential beneficiaries depends only on the inter-village 
targeting. On the other hand, the distribution of actual beneficiaries depends on inter- and intra-village 
selection. 
- Similarly, in Fig.2B, potential benefit size is defined as the per household grant value. The distribution of 
this value reflects the inter-village targeting. On the other hand, the distribution of the average loan size 
shows the combined effects of the selection of villages and the within-village allocation of loan money. 
30Figure 3: Within-village distribution of IDT beneficiaries and benefits by quintile of standardized 
predicted PCE (1996 and 1997, Rural Indonesian villages funded at least once in IDT) 
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Fig.3C: Within-village concentration curves for   Fig.3D: Changes in within-village 
concentration  
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Sources: 1996 and 1997 SUSENAS and IDT data.  
Notes:  
-  Fig.3A depicts the non-parametric relationship between the share of households in targeted 
villages that became eligible for an IDT loan by 1997 and the predicted, standardized 
household PCE. It also indicates the relationship between the share of households that 
received an IDT loan by 1997 and the predicted standardized household PCE. The non-
parametric estimation is based on STATA’s lowess procedure. The straight lines indicate 
the OLS fitted values. 
-  Similarly, Fig.3B shows linear and non-parametric relationships for the total loan value 
received under IDT with and without including non-participants as zeros.   
-  Fig.3C shows the cumulative shares of eligible households and participating households 
that are from each of the quintiles defined by the predicted standardized household PCE. It 
also shows the cumulative share of loan money accruing to households with the predicted 
standardized PCE falling in each of the quintiles.  
-  Fig.3D depicts the concentration curve for annual benefits. The share of beneficiaries 
shows the same pattern of changes. 
31 
Table 1: Heterogeneity by village characteristics in the relationship between predicted, standardized household PCE and IDT eligibility, participation, and loan size (1997, Rural Indonesia) 
Household-level analysis based on the village-level fixed effects model                
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) 










Average degree of targeting  -0.064 -0.058  -0.009  -0.944  -27.796 
P-value  0.000 0.000  0.002  0.867 0.000 
Predicted standardized household PCE  0.085 0.078  0.019 53.979  104.639 
  [0.022]** [0.021]**  [0.025]  [49.922] [26.632]** 
The interaction between the predicted household PCE and:  -0.0104  -0.0104  0.1798    -7.4700 
Village-level average predicted PCE (1,000 rupiah, 1995 Jakarta prices)  -0.001  -0.001  0  -0.591  -0.72 
  [0.000]** [0.000]**  [0.000]  [0.814]  [0.332]* 
Village-level coefficient of variation in the predicted PCE  -0.174  -0.165  -0.032  -77.962  -73.607 
     [0.025]** [0.024]**  [0.030]  [52.136] [23.260]** 
Budget size (Total (1994-96) per household grant value in the village)   -0.001  -0.001  0  -0.317  -1.422 
  [0.000]** [0.000]**  [0.000]  [0.471]  [0.345]** 
Density (100 persons per hectare)  -0.029 -0.055  -0.15 105.213  6.397 
  [0.040] [0.041]  [0.079]  [117.047]  [22.414] 
Share of household heads in the village who completed primary education or above  -0.018  -0.012  -0.006  2.498  -8.188 
  [0.011] [0.011]  [0.011] [30.921]  [13.668] 
Village level education Gini index  -0.007 0.002  0.006 -31.102  -33.017 
   [0.013] [0.013]  [0.012] [32.874]  [13.759]* 
1{village head is aged 39 or less}  0.012 0.012  0.007  7.672 -3.74 
  [0.007] [0.007]  [0.008] [18.853]  [9.713] 
1{village head is aged 39 or less and completed high school or higher education}  -0.019  -0.014  0.004  -0.815  2.161 
  [0.007]** [0.007]*  [0.007]  [20.014]  [9.946] 
1{village head is aged between 40 and 47}  -0.002 0.004  0.011  8.061 7.487 
  [0.007] [0.007]  [0.007] [20.853]  [9.083] 
1{village head is aged between 40 and 47 and completed junior high school or higher education}  -0.003  -0.001  -0.001  10.219  -9.147 
  [0.007] [0.007]  [0.007] [16.009]  [8.000] 
1{village head is aged 48 and above and completed junior high school or higher education}  -0.005  -0.005  -0.004  13.388  -6.312 
  [0.007] [0.007]  [0.008] [21.681]  [8.503] 
1{village head is female}  -0.002 0.003  -0.004 18.264  1.405 
   [0.018] [0.016]  [0.011] [26.284]  [8.332] 
1{village government (LKMD) is established} * 1{Outside of Java}  -0.004  -0.005  -0.002  0.627  -16.535 
  [0.005] [0.005]  [0.006] [15.530]  [7.781]* 
1{village government (LKMD) is established} * 1{Java}  -0.012  -0.017  -0.02  58.219  5.202 
  [0.012] [0.011]  [0.014] [49.558]  [18.040] 
1{village has farmers' associations}  -0.001 -0.005  -0.009  -6.459 -1.743 
  [0.005] [0.005]  [0.005] [12.320]  [6.043] 
1{village has groups of advisors such as agricultural extension and health and nutrition}  0.005  0.004  -0.002  16.89  4.77 
   [0.005] [0.005]  [0.004] [11.827]  [6.525] 
1{village has at least one cooperative}  0.005 0.001 -0.007  -14.112  -4.248 
  [0.005] [0.005]  [0.008] [10.340]  [5.912] 
1{village has at least one bank}  -0.01 -0.005 0.012  9.548 4.865 
  [0.006] [0.006]  [0.009] [16.340]  [5.847] 
1{village received at least one credit program in the previous year}  -0.013  -0.01  0.01  7.295  -0.956 
  [0.005]* [0.005]*  [0.006]  [12.767] [5.922] 
321{village's main access is through land}  -0.009 -0.007  0.003 -11.304  -19.941 
  [0.007] [0.007]  [0.007] [21.740]  [11.663] 
1{village's main access is through land and the inter-village road is made of asphalt or hardened}  0.008  0.005 -0.007  19.999  13.452 
  [0.005] [0.005]  [0.006] [11.636]  [5.720]* 
1{village has access to public transportation within the village}  0.002  0.005 0.006 3.832  5.447 
  [0.004] [0.004]  [0.005] [10.448]  [5.274] 
1{village has a public television}  -0.001 -0.004  -0.008  7.764 4.584 
  [0.005] [0.005]  [0.006] [15.467]  [5.901] 
1{village has a post office}  0.003 -0.003  -0.02  -6.327  -7.165 
   [0.008] [0.008]  [0.017] [18.746]  [5.519] 
1{village experienced natural disasters such as droughts, floods, earthquakes and volcano   -0.002  -0.004  -0.008  -0.967  5.355 
   eruptions at least once in the past three years}  [0.005]  [0.004]  [0.005]  [12.338]  [5.604] 
1{village had epidemic such as vomiting, diarrhea, and dengue fever in the previous year}  -0.005  0  0.011  -11.669  -5.659 
   [0.005] [0.005]  [0.006] [11.527]  [6.298] 
1{village's grant status in 1993 depends on field officers' subjective perceptions}  -0.013  -0.01  0.001  3.507  -0.081 
  [0.006] [0.006]  [0.007] [17.305]  [9.388] 
1{village is newly added to the treatment group in 1995}  -0.021  -0.009  0.005  11.655  7.485 
  [0.010]* [0.009]  [0.011]  [31.024]  [15.339] 
1{village is newly added to the treatment group in 1996}  -0.001  0.011  0.002  0.107  -0.233 
  [0.011] [0.010]  [0.013] [27.666]  [13.729] 
1{village was once funded, but dropped out of the treatment group in 1995 or 96}  0.035  0.032  0  -24.852  2.56 
  [0.011]** [0.011]**  [0.007]  [23.190]  [18.009] 
Difference between the village score and the 1993 provincial threshold  0.008  0.005  -0.002  -10.396  2.633 
  [0.003]* [0.003]  [0.004]  [9.293] [3.268] 
Difference between the village score and the 1994 provincial threshold  -0.003  0.001  0.005  -0.902  -3.571 
  [0.002] [0.002]  [0.003]  [6.176] [2.630] 
1{village was funded in 1993 or 1994 despite the rules suggesting no funding}  0.006  -0.004  -0.023  24.545  -26.441 
   [0.018] [0.017]  [0.018] [43.208]  [20.817] 
1{Sumatera}  0.013 -0.006 -0.008  13.42  -19.763 
  [0.009] [0.009]  [0.009] [21.934]  [11.316] 
1{Java}  0.02 0.004 0.007  -90.627  -30.893 
  [0.015] [0.015]  [0.019] [57.907]  [21.651] 
1{Nusa Tenggera}  -0.011 -0.015  -0.009  9.647 -9.867 
  [0.010] [0.009]  [0.010] [19.030]  [8.769] 
1{Kalimantan}  0.01 -0.002 -0.008  -37.389  -56.246 
  [0.010] [0.010]  [0.013] [42.647]  [17.948]** 
1{Sulawesi}  -0.01 -0.02 0.006  -26.143  -18.548 
   [0.011] [0.010]*  [0.011]  [20.389]  [10.346] 
Observations  46836 46836  19091  16048 46836 
Villages  2832 2832  2382  2241 2832 
F-stat  28.14 24.66  0.97  0.86  5.58 
Sources: 1996 and 1997 SUSENAS, 1993 PODES, and IDT data. 
Notes: 1. p values in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
2. See the Notes for Appendix Table 1 for the definition of the outcome and explanatory variables.  
3. All the loan and grant values as well as the PCE values are in terms of 1,000 rupiah, 1995 Jakarta prices.  
4. All the regression equations include five dummy variables indicating regions (Sumatera, Java, Nusa Tenggera, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi). 
5. Predicted household PCE is based on the pre-program relationship between household PCE and characteristics (Appendix Table 2). The predicted value is standardized within the village to focus on the relative poverty level of households within the 
village. 
33Table 2: Village characteristics associated with the shares of overall beneficiaries and benefits found in the bottom one and two quintiles of predicted household PCE (1997, Rural Indonesia) 
Village-level analysis based on the province-level fixed effects model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Share of eligible households whose 
PCE is below: 
Share of participating households 
whose PCE is below: 
Share of loan money provided to 
households whose PCE is below: 
   20th pctile  40th pctile  20th pctile  40th pctile  20th pctile  40th pctile 
        
  0.013 0.026 0.008 0.020 0.009 0.019 
Village-level average predicted PCE   0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
  [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** 
Village-level coefficient of variation in the predicted  PCE  0.139  0.28  0.082 0.221 0.095 0.209 
     [0.050]**  [0.059]** [0.056] [0.066]** [0.059] [0.070]** 
Budget size (Total (1994-96) per household grant value in the village)   0  0  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Density (100 persons per hectare)  -0.081 -0.043 -0.052 -0.062 -0.032 -0.076 
  [0.090] [0.105] [0.099] [0.116] [0.104] [0.123] 
Share of household heads in the village who completed primary education or above  -0.041  0.01  -0.036  0.044  -0.033  0.037 
  [0.023] [0.027] [0.026] [0.030] [0.027] [0.032] 
Village level education Gini index  -0.01 0.065  -0.009 0.08 0.004 0.083 
  [0.029] [0.034] [0.032]  [0.038]*  [0.034]  [0.040]* 
1{village head is aged 39 or less}  -0.025  -0.03  -0.027 -0.034 -0.024 -0.032 
  [0.013] [0.015] [0.014]  [0.017]*  [0.015] [0.018] 
1{village head is aged 39 or less and completed high school or higher education}  0.038  0.042  0.034  0.046  0.034  0.05 
  [0.015]* [0.017]* [0.016]* [0.019]* [0.017]* [0.020]* 
1{village head is aged between 40 and 47}  -0.006  0.011  -0.011 0.01  -0.01 0.008 
  [0.013] [0.016] [0.015] [0.018] [0.016] [0.019] 
1{village head is aged between 40 and 47 and completed junior high school or higher education}  -0.002  0.011  -0.009  0.002  -0.001 0.012 
  [0.015] [0.017] [0.016] [0.019] [0.017] [0.020] 
1{village head is aged 48 and above and completed junior high school or higher education}  -0.02  0.004  -0.023  0.008  -0.021  0.019 
  [0.014] [0.016] [0.016] [0.018] [0.016] [0.019] 
1{village head is female}  -0.022 0.022 -0.036 0.013 -0.037 0.015 
   [0.032] [0.038] [0.036] [0.043] [0.038] [0.045] 
1{village government (LKMD) is established} * 1{Outside of Java}  -0.007  -0.012  -0.005  -0.007  0  -0.009 
  [0.011] [0.013] [0.012] [0.014] [0.013] [0.015] 
1{village  government  (LKMD)  is  established}  *  1{Java}  -0.019 -0.037 -0.014 -0.044 -0.032 -0.062 
  [0.034] [0.040] [0.037] [0.044] [0.039] [0.046] 
1{village has farmers' associations}  0.001 0.009 0.006 0.013 0.003 0.013 
  [0.009] [0.011] [0.010] [0.012] [0.011] [0.013] 
1{village has groups of advisors such as agricultural extension and health and nutrition}  -0.01  -0.018  -0.021  -0.022  -0.024  -0.029 
   [0.009]  [0.011] [0.010]* [0.012] [0.011]*  [0.013]* 
1{village has at least one cooperative}  0.007 -0.008 0.008 -0.004 0.018 0.008 
  [0.011] [0.013] [0.013] [0.015] [0.013] [0.016] 
1{village has at least one bank}  -0.021 -0.026 -0.037  -0.04  -0.031 -0.034 
  [0.014] [0.016]  [0.015]*  [0.018]*  [0.016] [0.019] 
1{village received at least one credit program in the previous year}  0.014  0.013  0.005  0.004  0.004  0.001 
34  [0.010] [0.012] [0.011] [0.013] [0.012] [0.014] 
1{village's main access is through land}  0.03  0.019 0.026 0.025 0.032 0.024 
  [0.015]*  [0.017] [0.017] [0.020] [0.018] [0.021] 
1{village's main access is through land and the inter-village road is made of asphalt or hardened}  -0.017  -0.018 -0.019 -0.021 -0.024 -0.03 
  [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.013]  [0.011]*  [0.013]* 
1{village has access to public transportation within the village}  0.011 0.021 0.014 0.028  0.01  0.02 
  [0.009] [0.011]* [0.010] [0.012]* [0.011]  [0.013] 
1{village has a public television}  0.01  0.018 0.005 0.021 0.003 0.015 
  [0.010] [0.012] [0.011] [0.013] [0.012] [0.014] 
1{village has a post office}  -0.017 0.049 -0.002 0.053 0.003  0.06 
   [0.019] [0.022]* [0.021] [0.025]* [0.022] [0.026]* 
1{village experienced natural disasters such as droughts, floods, earthquakes and volcano   -0.004  -0.007  0.014  0.003  0.018  0.003 
   eruptions at least once in the past three years}  [0.009]  [0.010]  [0.010]  [0.012]  [0.010]  [0.012] 
1{village had epidemic such as vomiting, diarrhea, and dengue fever in the previous year}  0.004  0.012  -0.002  -0.005  -0.005  -0.008 
  [0.010] [0.012] [0.011] [0.013] [0.012] [0.014] 
1{village's grant status in 1993 depends on field officers' subjective perceptions}  -0.008  0.025  -0.013  0.012  -0.012  0.016 
  [0.013] [0.016] [0.015] [0.017] [0.016] [0.018] 
1{village is newly added to the treatment group in 1995}  -0.029  0.014  -0.033  0.002  -0.025  0.005 
  [0.020] [0.024] [0.023] [0.027] [0.024] [0.028] 
1{village is newly added to the treatment group in 1996}  -0.002  0.024  -0.013  0.016  -0.007  0.032 
  [0.022] [0.025] [0.025] [0.029] [0.026] [0.031] 
1{village was once funded, but dropped out of the treatment group in 1995 or 96}  -0.026  -0.015  -0.008  0.008  -0.01  0.002 
   [0.022] [0.025] [0.024] [0.028] [0.025] [0.030] 
Difference between the village score and the 1993 provincial  threshold  0.002 -0.006 0.006 -0.003 0.004 -0.004 
  [0.007] [0.009] [0.008] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010] 
Difference between the village score and the 1994 provincial threshold  0.002  0.002  0.001  0  0  -0.001 
  [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] 
1{village was funded in 1993 or 1994 despite the rules suggesting no funding}  -0.037  -0.035  -0.036  -0.022  -0.031  -0.026 
  [0.035] [0.041] [0.039] [0.046] [0.041] [0.049] 
Observations  2382 2382 2241 2241 2241 2241 
F-stat  2.33 3.21 1.63 2.34 1.62  2.3 
F(Prov FE)  2.37 1.94 1.88 1.56 1.91 1.65 
 Sources: 1996 and 1997 SUSENAS, 1993 PODES, and IDT data. 
Notes: 1. p values in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
2. See the Notes for Appendix Table 1 for the definition of the outcome and explanatory variables.  
3. All the loan and grant values as well as the PCE values are in terms of 1,000 rupiah, 1995 Jakarta prices.  








35Table 3: Changes in the heterogeneity by village characteristics in the relationship between predicted, standardized household PCE and IDT participation and loan size (1994-1996, Rural Indonesia) 
Household-level analysis based on the village-level fixed effects model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 














Average degree of targeting  -0.028 0.008 0.011 -9.384 4.100 7.205 
P-value  0 0 0 0  0.0101  0.002 
Year dummy   -0.015  0.012  -6.049  5.286 
   [0.004]**  [0.006]*   [2.123]**  [4.463] 
Predicted standardized household PCE  0.016 0.014 0.024  15.755  7.491  16.392 
  [0.010] [0.013] [0.019]  [6.660]*  [9.208]  [14.523] 
The interaction between the predicted household PCE and:             
Village-level average predicted PCE   0 0 0  -0.207  0.086  -0.103 
  [0.000]** [0.000]  [0.000] [0.079]** [0.135]  [0.220] 
Village-level coefficient of variation in the predicted  PCE  -0.08  0.023  0.004 -21.176  15.154 -5.434 
     [0.013]** [0.015]  [0.024] [7.799]**  [10.743] [14.763] 
Budget size (Cumulative per household grant value in the village)  -0.001  0  0  -0.455  0.161  0.206 
  [0.000]**  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.208]*  [0.212] [0.271] 
Density (100 persons per hectare)  -0.008 0.01  0.02 -0.793 0.56 18.675 
  [0.008] [0.008] [0.026] [2.294] [2.897]  [17.661] 
Share of household heads in the village who completed primary education or above  -0.008  0.002  0  -3.038  -1.863  5.841 
  [0.005] [0.007] [0.010] [3.711] [5.324] [9.727] 
Village level education Gini index  0  -0.002 0.021 -3.141 -9.052 8.819 
   [0.007] [0.008] [0.012] [3.378] [5.694] [8.942] 
1{village head is aged 39 or less}  0.002 0 0.002  -1.608  -0.189  2.625 
  [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [2.753] [3.418] [6.323] 
1{village head is aged 39 or less and completed high school or higher education}  -0.009  0.01  0.005  0.101  1.974  -2.063 
  [0.004]*  [0.004]*  [0.007] [2.779] [4.482] [6.064] 
1{village head is aged between 40 and 47}  0 0.004  -0.005  1.13  2.831  -7.583 
  [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [2.640] [3.491] [6.642] 
1{village head is aged between 40 and 47 and completed junior high school or higher education}  -0.002  -0.004  0.005  -0.731  -3.946 5.163 
  [0.003] [0.005] [0.007] [2.019] [3.145] [5.310] 
1{village head is aged 48 and above and completed junior high school or higher education}  -0.001  -0.002  -0.006  -1.814  -0.473  -0.169 
  [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [2.971] [3.682] [6.107] 
1{village government (LKMD) is established} * 1{Outside of Java}  0.001  -0.002  0.003  -1.148  -2.372  -4.271 
  [0.002] [0.003] [0.005] [2.398] [3.201] [4.966] 
1{village government (LKMD) is established} * 1{Java}  -0.017  0.003  0.024  -3.78  1.973  8.331 
  [0.006]**  [0.008]  [0.012]*  [2.346] [3.527] [8.665] 
Observations     238572     238572 
Villages     4712    4712 
F-stat        11.88        5.73 
Sources: 1996 and 1997 SUSENAS, 1993 PODES, and IDT data. 
Notes: 1. p values in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
2. See the Notes for Appendix Table 1 for the definition of the outcome and explanatory variables.  
3. All the loan and grant values as well as the PCE values are in terms of 1,000 rupiah, 1995 Jakarta prices.  
4. A selected set of estimates is shown. The regression equations include the same set of village characteristics as Table 1, interacted with the household relative poverty level and the year dummies.  
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Table 4: Changes in the association between village characteristics and the shares of beneficiaries and benefits found in the bottom four deciles of predicted household PCE (1994-1996, Rural Indonesia) 
Village-level analysis based on the village-level fixed effects model 
  Poor households = PCE is below 20th percentile  Poor households = PCE is below 40th percentile 
 
Share of participating 
households that are poor 
Share of loan money 
provided to the poor 
Share of participating 
households that are poor 
Share of loan money 
provided to the poor 


















1{1994 per household grant value is greater than the median}  -0.004    -0.003    -0.003    -0.002   
  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  
Year dummy  -0.074 -0.142 -0.046 -0.139 0.053 -0.047 0.094 -0.008 
  [0.078] [0.117] [0.083] [0.119] [0.089] [0.138] [0.093] [0.141] 
Village-level average predicted PCE   -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.002 
  [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] 
Village-level coefficient of variation in the predicted PCE  -0.02  -0.113 -0.041 -0.093 -0.199 -0.028 -0.183 0.017 
     [0.103] [0.156] [0.105] [0.161] [0.119] [0.180] [0.123] [0.188] 
Budget size (Cumulative per household grant value in the village)  0.001  0.002  0.001  0.002  0.001  -0.001  0  -0.002 
  [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] 
Density (100 persons per hectare)  -0.096 -0.108 -0.094 -0.071 -0.163 -0.145 -0.164 -0.123 
  [0.047]*  [0.164]  [0.046]*  [0.171] [0.043]** [0.253] [0.043]** [0.275] 
Share of household heads in the village who completed primary education or above  0.115  0.006  0.122  0.016  0.109  -0.031  0.101  -0.021 
  [0.047]* [0.069] [0.048]* [0.070] [0.053]* [0.080]  [0.055]  [0.081] 
Village level education Gini index  -0.012 -0.086 -0.014  -0.08  0.018 -0.147 -0.003  -0.15 
   [0.052] [0.081] [0.052] [0.082] [0.062] [0.095] [0.066] [0.096] 
1{village head is aged 39 or less}  0.031 0.068 0.033  0.06 -0.027 0.027 -0.023 0.024 
  [0.029] [0.040] [0.030] [0.041] [0.032] [0.046] [0.033] [0.047] 
1{village head is aged 39 or less and completed high school or higher education}  -0.06  0.006  -0.072  0.003  -0.027  -0.015  -0.036  -0.022 
  [0.029]*  [0.041]  [0.030]*  [0.042] [0.033] [0.049] [0.034] [0.050] 
1{village head is aged between 40 and 47}  -0.003  0.034  -0.007  0.011  -0.04  -0.014  -0.037  -0.032 
  [0.029] [0.042] [0.030] [0.043] [0.032] [0.047] [0.033] [0.048] 
1{village head is aged between 40 and 47 and completed junior high school or higher education}  0.002  -0.007  0  0.017  0.024  -0.01 0.021 0.011 
  [0.030] [0.041] [0.031] [0.041] [0.036] [0.050] [0.037] [0.051] 
1{village head is aged 48 and above and completed junior high school or higher education}  -0.01  -0.009  -0.016  -0.011  -0.073  -0.026 -0.073 -0.023 
  [0.033]  [0.046]  [0.034]  [0.047] [0.035]* [0.051] [0.036]* [0.053] 
1{village government (LKMD) is established} * 1{Outside of Java}  -0.024  0.013  -0.024  0.027  0.006  -0.01  0.002  0 
  [0.022] [0.029] [0.023] [0.030] [0.026] [0.036] [0.027] [0.037] 
1{village government (LKMD) is established} * 1{Java}  0.14  0.159  0.124  0.143  0.104  0.118  0.094  0.1 
  [0.090] [0.095] [0.092] [0.095] [0.079] [0.105] [0.080] [0.107] 
Observations   5926  5926  5926  5926 
F-stat   1.65  1.69  1.63  1.68 
F(Prov FE)     3420     3420     3420     3420 
Sources: 1996 and 1997 SUSENAS, 1993 PODES, and IDT data. 
Notes: 1. p values in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
2. See the Notes for Appendix Table 1 for the definition of the outcome and explanatory variables.  
3. All the loan and grant values as well as the PCE values are in terms of 1,000 rupiah, 1995 Jakarta prices.  
4. A selected set of estimates is shown. The regression equations include the same set of village characteristics as Table 2, except for the dummy variables indicating villages newly added in 1995 and 1996. This is because, within each year, all the 
included (thus funded) villages take the value of one for these variables. 
 
 
37Appendix 1: Dierence in Neutral Allocation
The household- and village-level analyses implicitly assume that dierent types of allocation changes,
namely, additive and proportional changes, are targeting neutral. Suppose for simplicity the following speci-
cations.
Yij = 0 + 0Xij + 1[Xij  Vj] + j + ij (5)
Yj = 0 + 0Vj + j (6)
Suppose that the average allocation in village j is y1
j;;y
Nj
j . If villages indicated by a dummy Vj deviate
from this allocation by providing  to all households, the new allocation is y1
j +;;y
Nj
j +. Since this change
is absorbed by the village xed eects, the estimate for 1 will be insignicant. On the other hand, this
could be detected in Eq.(5) as a signicant change in targeting performance. Suppose that a dummy variable
Dij indicates relatively poor households, and a fraction s of the households are regarded as poor. Then,
the concentration measure Yj can be expressed as Bp=B where Bp = [yij  dij] and B = yij. For villages
indicated by Vj, the outcome variable is (B0
p=B0) = [(yij+)dij]=(yij+). The deviation from the overall
average is (Bp=B)   (B0
p=B0) = c  [Bp   sB] where c = Nj  [=B]  B0. Thus, if the average allocation does
better than the universal allocation (Bp=B > s), the additive allocation change leads to deteriorated targeting.
For example, Table 2 shows that only the village-level analysis results show that a young and less educated
village head is associated with worse targeting. This suggests that these villages allocate more benets (of
the same size) to both the relatively poor and wealthy compared to the overall performance, which results in
deterioration of targeting measured by concentration. Villages that had a post oce and public transportation
are likely to provide less benets of the same size to the relatively poor and wealthy; as a result they exhibit
more concentration of benets among the bottom 40% of households.
On the other hand, a proportional change in which y0
ij = yij
 (
 > 1) is regarded as neutral by the
concentration measure. This change however is regarded as a deviation in Eq.(5). Suppose that the demeaned
data is y












T. Thus, if T < 0, a proportional
change is regarded as an improvement in the village xed model. For example, a larger budget is associated
with better targeting only in the household-level analysis (Table 1). This suggests that villages with a larger
budget attain a larger within-village gap in the probability of being a beneciary between relatively poor and
wealthy households; however, the increments are proportional to the probabilities attained by these households
in villages with a smaller budget, and thus not detected by the village-level analysis as targeting-improving.
Appendix 2: The dierence in the sample
Another methodological dierence is that the village-level analysis uses villages where at least one house-
hold participates in the program. If such villages also have unobserved factors, such as a preference for wider
coverage, and they systematically aect targeting, then the results without the selection correction could be
biased. Unfortunately, the data do not provide a factor that induces villages to have at least one surveyed
household to participate, yet does not aect targeting performance. Instead of doing the selection correction,
the household-level analysis results are examined based on villages included in the village-level analysis. The
results are substantively consistent.
38Appendix Table 1[A]: Summary statistics of outcome variables for rural Indonesia (1997) 
 Household-level outcomes  Obs. Mean  SD 
1 if a household is eligible (someone is a member of an IDT community group)  46836  0.408  0.491 
1 if a household has someone participating in IDT (receiving a loan)  46836  0.343  0.475 
Cumulative loan value among participants (Rp.1,000 (1995))  16048  468  972 
Cumulative loan value among all (Rp.1,000 (1995), including zeros)  46836  160  611 
      
 Village-level outcomes  Obs Mean  SD 
Share of eligible households whose PCE is less than the 20th percentile  2382  0.235  0.193 
Share of eligible households whose PCE is less than the 40th percentile  2382  0.447  0.227 
Share of participating households whose PCE is less than the 20th percentile  2241  0.237  0.208 
Share of participating households whose PCE is less than the 40th percentile  2241  0.447  0.246 
Share of loan money given to households whose PCE is less than the 20th percentile  2241  0.234  0.219 
Share of loan money given to households whose PCE is less than the 40th percentile  2241  0.446  0.259 
Sources: 1997 SUSENAS, 1993 PODES, and IDT data. 
Notes:1. An eligible household has a member who belongs to a community group that was the unit of loan management under IDT. 
2. A participating household has received at least one loan by January of 1997. 
3. Cumulative loan value is the total amount of money extended as credit between the beginning of IDT and January of 1997. 
4. The PCE is predicted based on the relationship between the actual PCE and household characteristics in 1993 and 1994 (see section 3). It is 
further standardized in each village. Thus, 20th and 40th percentile is measured within each village. 
 
Appendix Table 1[B]: Summary statistics of household characteristics for rural Indonesia (1997) 
Household chracteristics  Mean SD   
Per capita expenditure (PCE) per month (Rp.1,000 (1995))  46.95  26.72   
Predicted PCE per month (Rp.1,000 (1995))  46.61  16.98   
      
Characteristics of the household head      
Age  43.34 13.36   
Age^2  2057 1279   
1{Male}  0.894 0.308   
1{Single}  0.026 0.158   
1{Married}  0.854 0.353   
Educational attainment:      
   1{Attended but attained no degree}  0.293  0.455   
   1{Completed primary school}  0.304  0.460   
   1{Completed secondary school}  0.165  0.371   
1{Can speak Indonesian}  0.826 0.379   
1{Can read and write alphabet}  0.730  0.444   
      
Housing quality      
Floor area (1000m^2)  0.053 0.039   
1{Wall is made of inferior materials}   0.347  0.476   
1{Roof is made of inferior materials}   0.304  0.460   
1{Floor is made of inferior materials}   0.406  0.491   
1{Inferior source of light is used}   0.520  0.500   
1{No toilet facility}   0.420 0.494   
      
Demographic characteristics      
Household size  4.38 1.93   
Share of members aged 0-4  0.101 0.144   
Share of members aged 5-15  0.241 0.215   
Share of female members aged 16-55  0.281  0.172   
Share of male members aged 16-55  0.265  0.183   
Share of female members aged 56 and over  0.060  0.167   
Number of observations  46836      
Sources: 1997 SUSENAS, 1993 PODES, and IDT data. 
Notes: Categories omitted in the characteristics of household heads are being widowed or divorced (marital status) and having not attended 
school (educational attainment).
39Appendix Table1[C]: Summary statistics of village characteristics for rural Indonesia (1997) 
Village characteristics  Mean SD 
Characteristics of and heterogeneity in village residents    
Imputed household per capital expenditure (PCE) (1,000 rupiah, 1995 Jakarta prices)  46.536  10.375 
Coefficient of variation (CV) of imputed PCE  0.289  0.092 
Total per household grant value  (1,000 rupiah, 1995 Jakarta prices)  16.941  16.099 
Density (100 persons per hectare)  0.036 0.061 
Share of educated household heads who have completed the primary degree or above  0.471  0.262 
Education Gini index  0.386 0.216 
    
Characteristics of village head    
1{village head is aged 39 or less}  0.332 0.471 
1{village head is aged 39 or less and completed high school or higher education}  0.143  0.350 
1{village head is aged between 40 and 47}  0.310  0.463 
1{village head is aged between 40 and 47 and completed junior high school or higher education}  0.169  0.375 
1{village head is aged 48 and above and completed junior high school or higher education}  0.156  0.363 
1{village head is female}  0.014 0.119 
    
Characteristics of village administrative and social institutions    
1{village government (LKMD) is established} * 1{village is outside Java}  0.389  0.488 
1{village government (LKMD) is established} * 1{village is in Java}  0.241  0.428 
1{village has farmers' associations}  0.645 0.478 
1{village has groups of advisors such as agricultural extension and health and nutrition} 0.629  0.483 
    
Availability of financial institutions    
1{village has at least one cooperative}  0.205 0.404 
1{village has at least one bank}  0.123 0.328 
1{village received at least one credit program in the previous year}  0.343  0.475 
    
Transportation and communication infrastructure    
1{village's main access is through land}  0.879 0.327 
1{village's main access is through land and the inter-village road is made of   0.382  0.486 
   asphalt or hardened}    
1{village has access to public transportation within the village}  0.388  0.487 
1{village has a public television}  0.260 0.439 
1{village has a post office}  0.068 0.251 
    
Experiences of negative shocks    
1{village experienced natural disasters such as droughts, floods, earthquakes and volcano   0.381  0.486 
   eruptions at least once in the past three years}     
1{village had epidemic such as vomiting, diarrhea, and dengue fever in the previous year}  0.228  0.419 
    
Grant receipt status    
1{village's grant status in 1993 depended on field officers' subjective perceptions}  0.361  0.480 
1{village was newly added to the treatment group in 1995}  0.142  0.349 
1{village was newly added to the treatment group in 1996}  0.252  0.435 
1{village dropped out of the treatment group in 1995 or 1996}  0.043  0.203 
Difference between the village score and the 1993 provincial threshold  -0.263  1.189 
Difference between the village score and the 1994 provincial threshold  0.411  1.421 
1{village was funded in 1993 or 1994 despite the rules suggesting no funding}  0.015  0.122 
    
Regional dummies    
Sumatera  0.168 0.374 
Java and Bali  0.262 0.440 
Nussa Tenggara  0.250 0.433 
Kalimantan  0.108 0.311 
Sulawesi  0.091 0.288 
Number of observations (villages)  2832    
Sources: 1997 SUSENAS, 1993 PODES, and IDT data. 
Notes: 1. Omitted categories are East (regional dummies) and villages headed by persons aged 48 or above.  
2. Among grant receipt status, only the 1993 difference between the village score and the upper provincial threshold is used because this 
difference is highly correlated with the difference between the score and the lower threshold. Also, other types of errors in grant status 
assignment are too rare to be included. 
40Appendix Table 2: Pre-program relationship between household PCE and characteristics (1993 and 1994, rural Indonesia) 
Outcome = Household PCE (Rupiah, 1995 prices)    
Characteristics of the household head   
Educational attainment   
   Attended but no degree  443.808 
  [0.094]* 
   Primary degree  2,276.61 
  [0.000]*** 
   Secondary degree  15,182.19 
  [0.000]*** 
1{Can speak Indonesian}  3,064.76 
  [0.000]*** 
1{Can read and write alphabet}  1,022.47 
  [0.000]*** 
Age  397.461 
  [0.000]*** 
Age^2  -3.266 
  [0.000]*** 
1{Male}  -1,538.00 
  [0.000]*** 
1{Single}  6,687.94 
  [0.000]*** 
1{Married}  3,125.72 
  [0.000]*** 
Characteristics of the housing   
Floor area (1000m^2)  68,433.57 
  [0.000]*** 
1{Wall is made of inferior materials}   -3,087.55 
  [0.000]*** 
1{Roof is made of inferior materials}   -3,719.36 
  [0.000]*** 
1{Floor is made of inferior materials}   -4,552.76 
  [0.000]*** 
1{Inferior source of light is used}   -8,066.47 
  [0.000]*** 
1{No toilet facility}   319.332 
  [0.004]*** 
Demographic characteristics   
1{Household size = 2}  -25,650.35 
  [0.000]*** 
1{Household size = 3}  -35,281.77 
  [0.000]*** 
1{Household size = 4}  -41,608.42 
  [0.000]*** 
1{Household size = 5}  -45,869.71 
  [0.000]*** 
1{Household size = 6}  -49,401.85 
  [0.000]*** 
1{Household size >= 7}  -52,853.19 
  [0.000]*** 
Share of members aged 0-4  -13,536.10 
  [0.000]*** 
Share of members aged 5-15  -9,101.91 
  [0.000]*** 
Share of female members aged 16-55  -6,403.32 
  [0.000]*** 
Share of male members aged 16-55  9,872.63 
  [0.000]*** 
Share of female members aged 56 and over  -16,089.34 
   [0.000]*** 
Observations  250974 
R-Squared  0.8 
F-stat  19426 
Sources: 1993 and 1994 SUSENAS  
Notes: 1. p values in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
2. The regression also includes dummy variables indicating different provinces.
41Appendix Table 3: Household characteristics associated with IDT eligibility, participation, and loan size (1997, Rural Indonesia) 























Characteristics of the household head          
Educational attainment           
   Attended but no degree  -1.794  -1.605  -2.668  -29.307  0.828 
 [1.039]*  [1.028]  [21.244]  [15.183]*  [1.035] 
   Primary degree  -3.477  -2.785  7.762  -25.585  1.985 
 [1.152]***  [1.138]**  [22.372]  [14.140]*  [1.127]* 
   Secondary degree  -14.206  -12.071  16.619  -65.883  0.973 
 [1.260]***  [1.242]***  [23.611]  [15.632]***  [1.310] 
1{Can speak Indonesian}  1.453  1.081  -18.997  -6.518  0.284 
 [0.848]*  [0.814]  [19.889]  [10.037]  [0.799] 
1{Can read and write alphabet} 2.571  2.671  9.654  30.932  -0.374 
 [1.025]**  [1.018]***  [18.695]  [13.540]**  [1.061] 
Age 0.575  0.613  -0.207  2.463  0.288 
 [0.092]***  [0.090]***  [2.716]  [1.065]**  [0.106]*** 
Age^2 -0.007  -0.007  0.003  -0.028  -0.003 
 [0.001]***  [0.001]***  [0.030]  [0.011]**  [0.001]*** 
1{Male} 7.825  6.818  48.594  50.274  2.58 
 [1.115]***  [1.103]***  [23.321]**  [11.702]***  [1.261]** 
1{Single} -2.412  -2.109  -17.564  -22.059  -2.031 
 [1.373]*  [1.363]  [35.833]  [17.110]  [1.893] 
1{Married} 0.425  0.678  -4.577  2.868  -0.477 
 [0.888]  [0.890]  [21.492]  [11.174]  [0.948] 
Demographic characteristics          
Number of household members  1.376  1.326  2.511  6.841  0.301 
 [0.136]***  [0.132]***  [3.001]  [1.552]***  [0.143]** 
Share of members aged 0-4  6.627  6.473  -15.863  23.344  2.878 
 [2.514]***  [2.437]***  [80.162]  [28.163]  [2.824] 
Share of members aged 5-15  6.384  6.682  22.99  55.56  3.894 
 [2.173]***  [2.097]***  [70.970]  [23.462]**  [2.435] 
Share of female members aged 16-55  6.623  6.636  58.33  32.694  4.211 
 [2.257]***  [2.200]***  [72.468]  [23.723]  [2.711] 
Share of male members aged 16-55  1.57  3.178  6.655  35.523  4.991 
 [1.909]  [1.825]*  [65.966]  [24.061]  [2.198]** 
Share of female members aged 56 and 
over  -0.527 1.713 48.977 2.809  7.56 
 [2.312]  [2.262]  [90.573]  [26.178]  [2.956]** 
Characteristics of the housing          
Floor area (1000m^2)  -41.868  -40.503  90.79  -176.542  3.65 
 [6.478]***  [6.306]***  [117.060]  [52.370]***  [7.733] 
1{Wall is made of inferior materials}   5.213  4.709  -11.89  0.532  0.674 
 [0.659]***  [0.648]***  [15.637]  [8.086]  [0.721] 
1{Roof is made of inferior materials}   1.577  1.391  7.108  17.12  -0.123 
 [0.661]**  [0.655]**  [15.222]  [8.906]*  [0.645] 
1{Floor is made of inferior materials}   5.731  5.405  21.704  30.195  1.174 
 [0.637]***  [0.629]***  [13.641]  [7.006]***  [0.652]* 
1{Inferior source of light is used}   2.602  1.674  -11.841  1.503  -0.764 
 [0.697]***  [0.666]**  [16.768]  [8.176]  [0.691] 
1{No toilet facility}   2.7 1.727  -37.983  -6.944 -0.962 
    [0.633]*** [0.616]*** [13.243]***  [8.925]  [0.684] 
Observations 46836  46836  16048  46836  19091 
Villages 2832  2832  2241  2832  2382 
F-stat 59.45  51.67  1.35  9.45  2.69 
Sources: 1997 SUSENAS  
Notes: 1. p values in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
2. The regression also includes the village-level fixed effects. 
3. All the loan values are in terms of 1,000 rupiah, 1995 Jakarta prices.  
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